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17 1.  Introduction 
1 n  spite  of  an  apparent  coincidence  between  reI at i ve I  y  lower  income  per 
head  and  greater  distance  from  Brussels,  the  European  Economic  Community 
has  become  a  pole  of  attraction  worldwide.  Its  twelve  Member  States  are 
preparing Political,  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  (PEMU)  at  the  same  time  as 
other  European  nations  wish  to  have  ever-closer  links  with  the  Community 
(EC).  From  Austria,  Sweden  and  other  partners  in  the  European  Free  Trade 
Association  (EFTA)  to Turkey;  from  the  former  German  Democratic  Republic  to 
other  ex-Soviet  sate I I ites  in  Eastern  Europe  and  to Albania,  there  are more 
than  twe I  ve  European  countries  wishing  to  join  the  Community  sooner  or 
later. 
The  single  market  programme,  to  be  completed  by  1993,  is  gaining  added 
momentum  from  the  drive  towards  a  single  currency  while  the  negotiation  of 
a  European  Economic  Space  (EC  and  EFTA)  and  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  raise 
the  prospect  of  further  enlargements,  perhaps  doubling  the  number  of  Member 
States.  The  coordination  by  the  EC  of  assistance  to  Eastern  Europe, 
cooperation  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  a  number  of  initiatives  aimed  at 
helping  the  countries  worst-hit  by  the  Gulf  crisis  show  the  successive  if 
not  simultaneous  pursuit  of  EC  deepening  and  widening. 
A  search  for  greater  Community  operational ity  is  felt  in  the  twin 
Intergovernmental  Conferences  (IGC),  which  started  at  the  end  of  the 
Ita I ian  Presidency  of  the  Counc i I  of  Ministers  and  is  supposed  to  c I  ose 
with  the  Dutch  Presidency.  This  is  not  surpr1s1ng  in  I ight  of  the 
acceleration  registered  two  years  ago  with  the  Spanish  Presidency,  and 
maintained  by  France  and  Ireland.  Wi  I I  such  acceleration  make  it  easier  or 
harder  for  poorer  Community  members  to  catch-up?  This  is  the  issue  of 
economic  and  social  cohesion.  While  cohesion  is  seen  by  Portugal  as 
decisive  for  the  stabi I ity  and  hence  the  durabi 1 ity  of  PEMU,  the  parable 
told  here  is  not  specific  to  Portugal,  but  applies  to  all  catching-up 
countries  inside  and  outside  the  Community. 
The  basic  point  is  that  acceleration  wi  I 1  only  faci I itate cohesion  in  poor 
economies  if  there  is  a  change  in  economic  regime.  In  Spain  and  Por tug a I , 
such  change  began  with  accession  in  1986  but  it  must  be  sti I 1  consolidated. 
Aside  from  structural  adjustment,  Portugal  requires  a  substantial  reduction 
in  inflation.  In  Greece,  however,  the  change  in  regime  has  hardly  begun, 
ten  years  after  accession. 
It  is  of  course  possible  to  disregard  economic  and  social  cohesion  in  the 
drive  for  PEMU  and  to  consider  that  it  is  a  sufficient  condition  for  the 
success of  European  integration  if  that  integration guarantees  a  democratic 
political  system  in  Greece,  Portugal  or  Spain.  Such  a  view,  which  is 
commonly  held  in  countries seeking  accession,  makes  it  harder  to  change  the 
economic  regime  when  such  a  change  is  required  for  a  catching-up  country  to 
benefit  from  PEMU.  Even  if  joining  the  European  Community  could  act  as  a 
bulwark  against  dictatorship,  it  would  clearly  be  unable  to  offer  any 
insurance  against  poverty. 
If  the  Government  cannot  bring  about  the structural  changes  that  are  needed 
in  order  to  narrow  the  gap  between  the  joining  poorer  economy  and  those  of 
the  more  prosperous  European  countries,  then  integration  with  them  cannot 
guarantee  anything  whatsoever.  What  is  worse,  PEMU  could  lead  to  a 
situation  of  divergence  in  which  traditional  exports  and  transfers  from 
abroad  are  used  to  finance  public  sector  deficits,  thus  squandering  the 
development  aid  provided  through  Community  solidarity.  This  argument 
applies  to  any  of  the  divergent  countries  that  stilI  need  to  catch-up  and 
is  therefore  receiving  transfers  from  the  Community. - 2-
After  the  1988  reform,  Community  interventions  are  mostly  devoted  to 
ra1s1ng  efficiency  but,  given  the  large  amounts  involved,  they  do  imply  a 
form  of  fiscal  solidarity.  Indeed  transfers of  resources  could  build up  to 
as  much  as  3%  of  gross  domestic  product  in  Ireland  and  Greece  and  4%  of  GOP 
in  Portugal  by  1993  are  involved.  Wi  I I  this be  enough  for  the  three  poorest 
Member  States  reap  some  economic  benefits  during  the  transit ion  towards 
PEMU  ?  In  consequence,  should  the  catching  up  countries  lend  their  support 
to  the deeper  integration cal led  for  at  the current  IGCs,  thus enabling  the 
Community  to  be  subsequently  widened?  The  answer  d~pends  on  the 
effectiveness of  the  instruments  used  for  achieving  such  solidarity,  which 
in  the  final  analysis  has  to  do  with  the  mobi  I ity  of  the  factors  of 
production  that  are  labour  and  capital.  The  international  mobility  of 
financial  capital  has  been  achieved  across  the  Community,  including, 
somewhat  surprisingly,  the  poorer  members  that  have  not  yet  fully 
I iberal ized  capital  movements.  The  converse  is  true  of  labour,  where 
mobi I ity across  regions or  nations  is  the exception  rather  than  the  rule. 
To  argue  that  for  the  benefits actually  to accrue  there must  be  a  change  in 
economic  regime  is  tantamount  to  saying  that  a  better  mix  of  labour 
mobi  I ity  and  fiscal  solidarity  (i.e.  structural  funds)  needs  to  be 
achieved.  This  proposition,  which  is  borne  out  by  examination  of  the 
transition  of  the  Spanish,  Greek  and  Portuguese  economies,  is  also 
confirmed  by  the  transition  efforts  made  in  eastern  Europe  [1].  Moreover 
the  notion  of  "economic  regime  change  ..  has  been  used  in  the  Commission 
report  on  the  benefits  and  costs  of  economic  and  monetary  union  as  a 
condition  for  positive effects over  time  and  space  [2]. 
11.  Mobility and  Solidarity 
Solidarity  in  an  economic  regime  has  to  do  with  the  provision  of  pub I ic 
goods  through  taxation.  The  effectiveness of  taxation  is  determined  by  the 
mob iIi ty  of  the  tax  base.  This  is  how  an  economic  regime  ends  up  being 
largely  determined  by  the mobi I ity of  its underlying  factors of  production. 
If  all  goods  could -be  privately owned,  there  would  be  no  strictly economic 
argument  in  favour  of  fragmentation,  along  national  or  other  1 ines:  the 
whole  world  would  be  the  optimum  size  for  a  single  market.  The  same  would 
be  true  if  there were  only world-wide  public goods.  In  the  first  case  there 
wou I  d  be  no  taxes,  in  the  second  taxes  ought  to  be  I  ev i ed  at  the  wor I  d 
level  [3].  As  there  is  no  world  tax  authority,  these  world  wide  public 
goods  could only  be  provided  by  a  coal it ion  of  large  governments.  Mor~over, 
as  private and  public goods  mix,  not  even  nuclear  deterrence  and  the  g!obal 
warming  environment  can  be  seen  as  pure  worldwide  public goods. 
The  larger  the  distance  between  a  taxpayer  and  the  pub I ic  good,  the  easier 
it  is  for  taxation  to  be  avoided.  The  threat  of  a  .. free  ride"  by  distant 
taxpayers  leads  to smaller  communities,  where  solidarity,  expressed  through 
majority  vote,  I im its  tax  evasion.  Between  the  vi II age  and  the  wor I  d,  the 
nation  has  emerged  as  a  combination  of  market  and  state,  which  attempts  to 
trade off  mobility  and  solidarity.  In  the  vii lage,  there  is  solidarity  but 
the  tax  base  is outwardly mobile.  The  tax  base  cannot  move  out  of  the  world 
but  there  are  no  citizens  of  the  world  and  no  state  either.  From  an 
economic  standpoint,  the  specificity of  nations  I ies  in  the  combination  of 
personal  mobility  between  social  classes  and  geographical  regions  and  the 
supply  of  public  goods,  whose  consumption  is  determined  by  the  electorate 
and  has  to  be  financed  through  taxes  paid,  either  in  principle  or  in  the 
fact,  by  the  residents of  the  country  in  question  [4]. - 3-
The  social  cohesion  imp I icit  in  shared  pub I ic  goods  is,  all  in  all,  a 
reflection  of  the  legitimacy  of  the  State's  political  (and  taxation) 
powers,  essential  to  the  concept  of  a  democratic  nation.  The  rules 
governing  the  functioning  of  the  market,  among  which  the  observance  of 
contracts  and  individual  mobi  I ity  loom  large,  are  pub I ic  goods.  Since 
technology  and  personal  preferences  vary,  new  opportunities  emerge  for 
exchanging  information.  In  such  transactions,  public  and  private  goods 
intermingle,  justifying  a  hierarchy  between  the  levels  of  government 
underpinning  the market. 
In  accordance  with  the  principle of  subsidiarity  (expressed  by  the  Catholic 
Church  in  Quadragesimo  Anno  and  embodied  in  the  Treaty  of  Rome),  public 
goods  should  be  supplied  at  the  level  that  is  closest  to  their  consumers 
and  consistent  with  economic  efficiency- which  itself  depends  either  on 
the  state of  technology  or  on  individual  and  collective  preferences.  Given 
that  the  latter  are  normally  expressed  by  the  electorate,  it  can  be  seen 
that  economic  efficiency cannot  be  separated  from  collective choice  [5]. 
The  nation  state  is  the  sum  total  of  persons  who  have  more  or  less 
homogeneous  preferences  and  agree,  through  the  electoral  process,  to 
consume  certain  public  goods,  which  requires  that  they  pay  the  same  taxes. 
The  nation  tends  to  be  associated with  the  concept  of  the  State  because  the 
latter  is  the  organization  which,  by  exercising  political  power,  levies 
taxes  to  finance  expenditure- or,  in  other  words,  supply  pub I ic  goods.  The 
I imit  ·to  present  taxation  is  undoubtedly  enforcement  by  the  competent 
court,  but  this  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  the  tax  has  to  be  paid  by 
the  voter,  since  it  may  fal I  on  non-residents  or  indeed  future  residents. 
The  I imit  to  future  taxation  is  thus  the expectation of  social  mobi  I ity and 
of  the  provision  of  pub I ic  goods,  or  in  other  words,  the  decision  to 
maintain  residence within  a  particular  tax  territory. 
In  a  situation  where  residence  is  not  fixed,  if  the  public  goods  supplied 
are  not  sufficient,  taking  account  of  the  level  of  taxation,  so  that  net 
taxes  are  too  high,  some  residents  wi  I 1 feel  poorer  and  vote  to  raise gross 
taxes,  wh i I  e  others,  who  do  not  wish  to  consume  more  pub I i c  goods,  w  i I I 
want  net  taxes  to  remain  low.  When  a  new  equi 1  ibrium  has  been  established, 
there  is  still  a  possibility  that  the  rich  person  will  emigrate  to  a 
country  where  gross  taxes  are  lower  and  the  poor  person  to  a  country  where 
there  is greater  provision of  pub I ic  goods.  The  domain  of  the stable  trade-
off  between  mobi  I ity  and  the  solidarity may  therefore  be  smaller  or  larger 
than  the  nation,  and  it  w  i I I  certain I  y  increase  if  mob i I i ty  overcomes 
solidarity  as  expressed  in  a  majority  vote.  Now  mobility  varies  a  great 
dea I  across  peop I  e  and  factors  of  product ion.  If  the  dichotomy 
labour/capital  is  kept,  the  problem  can  be  i I lustrated  with  greater 
clarity. 
The  tax  on  the  income  from  capital  -an  internationally mobile  factor  - is 
seen  as  a  good  example  of  the  need  for  each  nation  to  maintain  tax 
competitiveness,  and  there  are  even  fears  that  competition  may  eliminate 
altogether  the  tax  on  mobile  factors,  so  as  to  lower  the  provision of  goods 
at  the  national  level  without  a  compensating  increase  at  community  or  world 
levels.  The  strategic  interaction between  nations  changes  when  there exists 
a  voting  mechanism,  however  because  voters  know  the  danger  of  "competitive 
tax  avoidance"  and  wi  II  try  to  minimize  it  by  electing  governments  with 
less  of  a  propensity  to  lower  taxes.  As  the  argument  applies  to  all 
countries,  the  political  economy  equi I ibrium  wi  I I  have  higher  taxes  on  the 
mobile  factor  than  the  pure  economic  equi I ibrium.  Strategic  interaction  is 
dampened  by  the  vote.  The  political  system  weakens  the  required  changes  in 
the  economic  environment.  Nevertheless,  it  turns  out  that  a  greater - 4-
mob i 1  i ty  on  the  tax  base  imp I i es  greater  economic  and  poI it i ca I 
convergence. 
Despite  the  fact  that  there  is  a  positive  relationship  between  mobi  I ity  and 
political  and  economic  convergence,  the  mobi  I ity of  persons  and  capital  can 
result  in  either  convergence  or  divergence,  economic  and  political.  The 
ex amp 1  e  of  divergence  comes  from  a  situation  where  I  abour,  rather  than 
capital,  is  taxed  and  where  the  political  and  economic  equi I ibrium  can 
exhibit  convergence  or  divergence  between  integrating  economies.  If  an 
economy  with  high  wages  in  the  export  sector  integrates  with  an  economy 
where  high  wages  occur  in  the  import  competing  sector,  then  inter-sectoral 
divergence  of  wages  rises as  a  consequence  of  integration,  and  the  same  is 
true of  taxes  [6]. 
The  analysis  can  be  refined  by  recogntztng  that  there  is  not  such  a  clear 
difference  between  I  abour  and  capita I,  as  some  forms  of  capita I  w  i I I  be 
incorporated  in  land  and  are  therefore  immobile,  whereas  ski I led  labour  is 
high I  y  mob i I  e  across  nations.  More  reI evant  to  cohesion  is,  however,  to 
recognize  the  social  and  political  imp I icat ions  of  labour  mobi  I ity.  In 
effect,  mobi  I ity  tends  to  be  restricted when  human  rights  are  curtailed  so 
that  divergence  is  exacerbated  and  so I i dar i ty  must  be  centra I i.zed.  This 
however  makes  solidarity  ineffective.  In  centrally  planned  economies, 
centralized fiscal  solidarity was  based  on  the  forced  immobi  I ity of  the  tax 
base.  In  centrally  planned  economies,  therefore,  when  the  ban  on  mobi  I ity 
is  defied,  the  system  rapidly  col lapses,  as  was  the  case  in  the  former  GDR 
in  the  summer  and  autumn  of  1989  and  perhaps  Albania  in  1991.  Given  the 
erosion  of  centralized state solidarity,  international  assistance- German 
national  in  the  case  of  GDR- was  cal led  for.  The  international  assistance 
effort  was  coordinated  by  the  EC  and  has  a I ready  shed  new  I i ght  on  the 
parable of  union  and  cohesion. 
111.  Development  Assistance 
The  mobi I ity  of  the  vote  and  of  the  tax  base  is  thus  at  the  centre  of 
efforts  to  promote  convergence  and  ensure  that  development  aid  is 
effective.  Moves  to  reduce  inequalities  in  the  distribution  of  wealth 
between  nations are occasionally criticized on  the  grounds  that  they  merely 
incite  either  the  donors  or  the  recipients  to  corruption  and  do  not  bring 
about  a  real  change  in  the  situation  as  regards  the  supply  of  public  goods 
or  improve  national  cohesion  in  the  recipient  countries.  On  the  contrary, 
they  can  interfere  with  social  mobi I ity,  leading  to  the  squandering  of 
foreign  aid  and  the  misappropriation  of  tax  revenue  for  the  authorities· 
own  benefit. 
For  these  reasons,  aid  shou I  d  not  be  managed  by  the  governments  of  the 
recipient  countries,  and  could  instead  be  regarded  as  a  private  good  which 
can  be  appropriated  by  entities which  do  not  belong  to  the  state,  such  as 
autonomous  regions or  local  communities,  on  the one  hand,  and  multinational 
entities,  such  as  the  EC  or  the  World  Bank,  on  the  other.  The 
regionalization  of  Community  assistance,  initiated  by  the  reform  of  1988, 
is  a  case  in  point.  Introducing  the  local  and  Community  level  is of  course 
no  guarantee  against  waste,  but  it  allows  a  better  operation  of  the 
principle of  subsidiarity discussed earlier. 
As  a  rule,  foreign  aid  is subordinate  to  foreign  pol icy,  which  is  conducted 
on  a  government-to-government  basis.  Foreign  aid  has  thus  traditionally 
been  viewed  in  the  same  way.  Apart  from  considerations  of  political 
expediency,  the  underlying  rationale  was  that  in  the  developing  countries, 
investment  in  i nf r ast ructures  was  more  soc i a I I  y  cost-ef  feet i ve  than  in - 5-
other  areas,  particularly  productive  activities  carried  on  by  the  private 
sector. 
Yet  the experience  accumulated  over  the  last  few  decades  by  the World  Bank, 
the  Community  and  major  donors  in  the  24  members  of  OECD  (which  are  known 
as  the  G24)  has  shown  that  this  is  frequently  not  the  case  - quite  the 
opposite.  Thus,  where  the State acts wrongly  or  fai Is  to do  what  it  should, 
pub I i c  aid  comes  to  be  associ a ted  with  both  inefficiency  and  injustice. 
Hence  the  desirabi I ity of ·a  type of  aid which  would  be  arranged  with  and  be 
channel led  directly  to  individual  private  agents  or  groupings  of  such 
agents.  The  conditions  under  which  it  would  be  possible  to  convince  the 
recipient  state  to  accept  this  approach  involve  a  certain  proximity  with 
the  donor.  In  other  words,  they  require  a  certain solidarity. 
Moreover,  one  should  be  aware  of  the  difficulties  involved  in  identifying 
recipient  groups,  difficulties  which  would  be  compounded  by  the  need  for 
those  groups  to  manage  the  machinery  established.  Aid  expectations  induce 
rent-seeking  behaviour  on  the  part  of  would-be  recipients.  As  a  culture of 
dependence  is  induced  on  aid  recipients,  the  ethical  argument  for 
assistance  ceases  and  solidarity  is  as  threatened  as  it  was  under  central 
planning.  This  is  why  machinery  must  be  set  up  for  monitoring  the 
effectiveness  of  aid  granted.  In  that  case  a  certain  amount  of  resistance 
is  to  be  expected  from  the  recipient  administrations,  which  prefer  to 
receive  funds  directly and  escape scrutiny  [7]. 
This  underscores  the  important  role  played  by  national  policies  in  changing 
the  economic  regime  and  the  need  for  democracy  to  make  the  change 
permanent.  The  existence  of  adequate  national  policies  is  a  necessary 
condition  for  economic  and  social  cohesion  in  a  PEMU.  Moreover,  the 
problems  of  identification  of  recipients  and  of  their  absorption  capacity 
without  perverse  changes  in  behaviour  suggest  common  supervision  rules such 
as  ones  introduced  in  the  reform  of  Community  structural  funds  in  1988.  In 
the  meantime,  new  pressures  of  convergence  and  divergence  emerged,  which 
suggest  the  need  to  adapt  Community  solidarity even  before  the  1988  reform 
has  borne  fruit. 
IV.  Nominal  and  real  convergence 
As  the  preparation  for  PEMU  proceeds,  the  deepening  and  widening  forces  of 
European  integration  have  become  apparent.  The  acceleration  visible  in  the 
PEMU  project  induces  add it iona I  pressures  for  convergence  and  divergence. 
These  additional  pressures  should  not  suggest  that  the  poorer  regions  and 
countries are  already  poised  to  narrow  the  gap  that  separates  them  from  the 
rest  of  the  Community.  Automatic  convergence  is  as  erroneous  a  view  as 
automatic  divergence.  The  I  ess  prosperous  Member  States  must  succeed  in 
boosting  per  capita  d i sposab I  e  income  reI at i ve  to  the  Community  average. 
But  such  an  increase  in  spending  must  be  underpinned  by  a  rise  in 
production,  and  this  in  turn  requires  successful  action  to  enhance 
competitiveness,  promote  national  savings  and  attract  foreign  private 
investment. 
In  these  circumstances,  diverse  national  economies  would  reap  the  benefits 
of  a  unified  market.  Even  if  that  were  the  case  for  a  time,  however,  it 
does  not  follow  that  inflation  rates  would  immediately  converge  to  the 
lowest  one.  For  macroeconomic  pol icy  to be  consistent  with  price stabi I ity, 
this  stability  must  be  imported  through  a  fixed  exchange  rate  with  the 
strongest  currency- which  ends  up  becoming  the single currency.  Or,  to  put 
the  problem  differently,  even  if  one  accepts  that  the  overal I  costs of  EMU 
will  be  outweighed  by  the  benefits,  one  still  needs  to  look  into  the 
distribution of  those  benefits  and  costs  through  time  and  space.  The  basic - 6-
question  is  to  determine  under  what  conditions  and  for  which  horizon  does 
the  mobi I ity of  individuals  and  firms  promote  cohesion. 
Within  countries,  there  is  a  fixed  exchange  rate  (a  single  currency), 
labour  mobi  I ity  and  fiscal  solidarity,  whereas  between  countries  there  is 
less  mobility,  less  solidarity  and  exchange-rate  flexibility.  This 
flexibility  is  greatest  for  those  countries  which  have  not  joined  the 
exchange  rate  mechanism  (Greece,  Portugal)  or  even  for  those  who  keep  a 
wide  band  (Spain,  United  Kingdom)  but  potential  flexibility  does  exist 
until  a  single  currency  is  introduced  across  the  Community.  The  current 
anxiety about  Italy,  whose  currency  has  been  in  the exchange  rate mechanism 
from  the  beginning  and  in  the  narrow  band  since early  1990,  i I lustrates  the 
point.  According  to  some  counts,  these  are  the  five  divergent  countries, 
according  to  other  counts,  only  Greece,  Italy  and  Portugal  might  threaten 
the  process  of  nominal  convergence  required  for  the  second  phase  to  begin 
sometime  in  the mid-nineties. 
V.  Nat ion  a I  and  common  po I i c i es 
According  to  the  traditional  theory  of  international  trade,  based  on  the 
concept  of  comparative  advantage,  economic  integration  leads  to  an 
equalization  of  the  prices  of  goods  and  factors  of  production  across 
nations even  though  by  definition  these only move  within  a  nation.  Trade  is 
seen  as  requiring  a  lasting  difference  between  industries  (inter-industry 
specialization)  but  not  between  national  incomes.  In  other  words,  the  more 
uniform  the  level  of  consumption,  the  more  diversified  the  production 
structure wi  I I  become.  On  this  traditional  view,  it  is a  uniform  prosperity 
combined  with  the  diversity  of  Member  States  which  wi  I I  act  as  a  catalyst 
for  the  emergence  of  more  advanced  forms  of  integration.  Reaching  these 
advanced  forms  wi  I I  in  turn enable  the  frontiers of  the  European  economy  to 
be  extended sti I I  further. 
Such  optimistic  view  has,  however,  always  been  pitted  against  a  different 
schoo I  of  thought  which  hoI ds  that  integration  w  i I I  be  achieved  at  the 
expense  of  the  outlying  regions  and  the  greater  specialization  of 
production  will  distort  the  level  and  pattern  of  consumption.  On  this 
second  view,  therefore,  diversity  wou I  d  be  i ncompat i b I  e  with  unity,  and 
there would  not  be  much  hope  for  the  least-developed countries and  regions, 
since  cumulative  out-migration  would  frustrate  the  catching-up  process, 
thereby  discouraging  investment  at  the  periphery  in  favour  of  investment  at 
the  center.  The  best  that  might  be  hoped  would  be  an  equalization of  I iving 
standards  achieved  through  the desertification of  the  regions  and  countries 
further  away.  While  this  solution might  be  acceptable  in  terms  of  economic 
convergence,  it  wou I  d  certain  1  y  prevent  po 1 it i ca I  convergence  because  it 
would  exacerbate  the  asymmetry  between  regions  and  threaten cohesion. 
Whatever  the  conditions  for  any  particular  low-income  territory  to  catch-
up,  the  horizon  is  sufficiently  distant  for  the  emergence  of  a  compromise 
between  the  optimistic  and  pessimistic  views.  The  most  frequent  compromise 
is  to  recommend  that  the different  stages on  the  road  to  integration  should 
be  accompanied  by  transfers of  resources  to  the  regions  lagging  behind.  But 
such  transfers  should  not  aim  at  buying  the  immobi  I ity  of  peripheral 
populations  through  subsidies  to  their  consumption  [8].  Rather  they  should 
have  the  effect  of  maintaining  cohesion  within  the  Community;  that  is  to 
maintain  competitive  production,  to  prevent  cumulative  out-migration,  and 
to  attract  capital.  The  Treaty  of  Rome,  as  amended  by  the 
Single  European  Act,  thus  states  that  the  Community  should  aim  at  reducing 
the  backwardness  of  the  least-favoured  regions  by  implementing  common 
policies  (Article 130b).  This  should  not  cause  one  to  overlook  the  fact 
that  the  responsibi I ity  for  the  catching-up  process  rests  first  and - 7-
foremost  with  the  Member  States  themselves.  Only  they  can  adopt  national 
policies designed  to promote  the catching up  process. 
VI.  National  and  regional  catching-up 
The  structural  Funds  and  the  Community's  other  financial  instruments 
(including  operations  financed  by  the  European  Investment  Bank)  are  thus 
intended  to support  the  process.  The  reform of  the structural  Funds  decided 
in  1988  and  the  objective  of  doubling  the  level  of  assistance  by  the  time 
the  i nterna I  market  is  comp I  eted  are  responses  to  the  new  threats  to  the 
cohesion of  a  Community- which  has  become  increasingly  heterogeneous.  With 
German  unification  and  the  two  most  recent  enlargements,  the  new 
north-eastern,  south-eastern,  southern  and  south-western  fringes  of  the 
European  economy  have  Joined  the  North  At I  antic  fringe,  represented  by 
Ireland,  as  low-income  areas.  The  apparent  coincidence  between  the  wealth 
gap  and  the  distance  from  Brussels politicizes the  catching-up  process. 
Although  such  pol iticization  makes  the  comparison  of  composite  indicators 
such  as  per  capita  income  particularly risky,  some  I ight  can  be  shed  on  the 
subject  by  the  attached  table,  which  only  deals  with  Member  States  rather 
than  regions  therein,  and  shows  the  relative  position  of  the  four  poorest 
from  1960  to  the  present  day.  The  indicator  used  is  gross  national 
disposable  product  per  capita  (adjusted  for  purchasing  power  standards)  as 
a  percentage  of  the  average  for  the  Community  of  Twelve.  Unlike  gross 
domestic  product,  which  is  a  more  commonly  used  composite  indicator,  gross 
national  disposable  product  excludes  resources  intended  to  remunerate 
foreign  factors  of  production  (such  as  repatriated  profits  or  interest  on 
foreign  debt)  but  includes  private  and  public  current  transfers  from 
abroad.  The  difference  between  the  two  indicators  is  given  in  the  table  1 
in  brackets,  again  as  a  percentage  of  the  Community  average  [9].  It  is 
justifiable  to  include  Spain.  Even  though  the  economy's  size  is  over  twice 
as  large  the  size  of  the  other  three  together,  and  even  though  several 
regions  in  Spain  are  rich,  one  half  the  population  I ives  in  poor  lands. 
Regardless  of  the  composite  indicator  chosen,  the  table  reveals  an  initial 
situation  in  which  Ireland  and  Spain  stood  at  around  60%  of  the  Community 
average,  compared  with  only  40%  in  Portugal  and  Greece.  Over  the  following 
three  decades,  the  catching-up  process  favoured  the  south-western  fringe. 
Spain  has  settled at  around  80%  after  reaching  a  peak  of  82%  in  1975,  when 
the  Community  average  declined  as  a  result  of  the  recession  that  followed 
in  the  wake  of  the  first  oi I  shock.  Ireland,  on  the  other  hand,  has  always 
remained  below  70%,  having  peaked  at  66%  in  1975  too.  Portugal  has 
consistently  hovered  around  60%,  its  peak  figure  being  62%  as  long  ago  as 
1973,  while  the  figure  for  Greece,  which  touched  62%  in  1978,  shortly 
before  the  country  Joined  the  Community,  has  been  edging  downwards  ever 
since.  If  the  trends  were  to  continue,  the  position  of  these  countries  on 
the  eve  of  the  single  market  would  be  as  follows:  Spain  out  in  front  and 
Greece  bringing  up  the  rear,  with  Ireland  and  Portugal  vying  with  each 
other  for  the  middle  ground. 
On  average,  Spain  is  relatively  close  to  the  average,  that  is  over  three 
quarters  of  Community  income  per  capita.  Furthermore,  the  size  of  the 
Spanish  economy  tends  to  situate  the  problem  of  the  spatial  effects  of 
monetary  union  at  regional  as  opposed  to  national  level.  This  is  even  more 
true  when  the  quasi  federal  nature  of  Spain's  constitutional  organization 
is  acknowledged.  In  that  sense,  central,  southern  and  northwestern  Spain 
ought  to  be  put  on  a  par  with  southern  Italy  and  eastern Germany,  which  are 
respectively  the  earliest  and  most  recent  of  the  Community's  peripheral 
regions. - 8-
Table  2  shows  the  poorest  regions  in  comparison  with  the  poorest  countries 
for  the  period  1986/88,  that  is  before  German  unification.  For  reference, 
national  averages  of  the  countries  in  table  1  plus  Italy  are  also  recorded 
as  a  percentage  of  the  Community  average.  The  comparison  shows  we I I  the 
convergence  of  Portugal  and  the  divergence  of  Greece.  As  for  regions, 
Calabria's  rank  is  above  Portugal's average,  but  not  Lisbon's,  which  is  the 
30th  poorest  region.  Ireland  is  a  single  region,  and  the  Community's  25th 
poorest.  It  is  noteworthy  that  data  for  Portugal's  Atlantic  autonomous 
regions,  Azores  and  Madeira,  are  not  available. 
Given  the  low  average  income  of  Portugal  and  of  the  Spanish  peseta,  the 
similarity  in  the  Lisbon  and  North  Portugal  pattern  is  remarkable,  both 
with  high  unemployment  and  high  population  density.  The  contrast  with 
Alentejo  and  Extremadura,  both  with  high  unemployment  and  low  population 
density,  is  reminiscent  of  the  coast/hinterland  distinction  found  for 
example  in  the  United  States.  This  distinction  reveals  the  attractiveness 
of  the  Southwestern  and  Eastern  Iberian  coast,  in  contradiction  with  the 
apparent  importance  of  distance  from  Brussels mentioned  at  the  outset.  The 
relevant  distance  is  economic  and  it  is  measured  by  time  rather  than  space 
travelled.  The  intermediate  pattern  of  Algarve  (lower  unemployment  and 
lower  density)  is  simi Jar  to  Greek  regions:  it  may  well  be  closer  to  the 
low  density  equi I ibr ium  than  to  the  high  unemployment  equi I ibr ium  but  it 
would  be  difficult  to go  further  with  the  indicators  available  in  table  2. 
The  rough  classification of  countries  and  regions  by  output  per  head  masks 
the  balance  that  may  be  struck  between  optimism  and  pessimism  as  to  the 
impact  of  integration  on  cohesion,  especially  for  the  three  poorest 
Member  States.  Rather  than  one  apparent  failure  and  two  border! ine  cases, 
what  we  have  is  a  catching-up  process  punctuated  with  advances  and 
setbacks.  Relative  income  is  fIat  in  Ireland  and  in  dec I ine  in  Greece. 
Indeed,  only  Portugal  has  matched  and  is  now  set  to  exceed  its  peak  figure 
of  the  1970s. 
VII.  Effects  through  time  and  space 
It  is  within  this  analytical  framework,  as  applied  to  all  twelve 
Member  States  of  the  Community,  that  the  Commission's  report  on  the 
benefits  and  costs  of  monetary  union  concluded  that  a  single  European 
currency  was  indeed  desirable  both  for  the  Community  as  a  whole  and  in 
terms of  the  distribution of  the  net  gains over  time  and  space  [10]. 
The  way  in  which  the  gains  materialize  over  time  and  space  obviously 
depends  on  other  conditions  - where  national  policies  are  prominent.  As 
regards  the  nature of  the  transition  to  monetary  union,  the  report  recal Is 
that  the  main  macroeconomic  costs  arise  at  the  beginning,  while  the  main 
microeconomic  benefits  wi  II  be  felt  at  the  end  of  the  process  - so  that 
only  a  swift  changeover  to  a  single currency  wi  I I  avoid  speculative attacks 
on  more  vulnerable  currency  parities.  Alongside  this  unfavourable  profile 
over  time,  the  report  draws  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  spatial 
distribution  of  the  effects  wi  II  necessitate  a  change  in  economic  regime 
that  is  all  the  more  comprehensive  the  more  the  national  structure  and 
system  diverge  from  the  Community  average. 
The  implications  of  the  analysis  are  clear  for  the  three  countries  which 
recently  joined  the  Community.  Has  there  been  a  change  of  economic  regime 
in  Greece,  Spain  and  Portugal?  The  answer  would  appear  to  be  no,  yes  and 
perhaps,  in  that  order.  As  for  Ireland,  which  has  been  a  member  for  longer, 
the  answer  is  also  yes,  but  the  turning-point  dates  from  more  than  ten 
years  after  accession  and  took  the  form  of  a  vigorous  budgetary 
consolidation  exercise  in  1986,  thirteen  years  after  accession  and  seven - 9-
years  after  pegging  the  exchange  rate.  Thus  we  cannot  exclude  that  the 
change  in  economic  regime  that  is  necessary  in  order  to  bring  about  the 
favourable effects of  integration wi  I I  take  time. 
Ten  years  after  accession,  can  it  be  said  that  the  change  in  regime  has 
occurred  in  Greece?  Probably  not,  even  though  the  Community  loan  of 
February  1991  explicitly  calls  for  such  a  change.  On  the  other  side,  the 
example  of  the  Spanish  peseta,  which  entered  the exchange  rate mechanism  on 
the  eve  of  the  Madrid  summit,  that  is  to  say  three  and  a  half  years  after 
accession,  shows  awareness  of  the  urgency  of  regime  change,  even  though  it 
may  also  indicate  haste  in  obtaining  political  dividends  from  the  measure. 
For  Portugal,  one  may  have  a  quasi-change  in  economic  regime,  soon  to  be 
consolidated  by  the  pre-pegging  float  initiated  in  October  1990. 
PEMU  may  therefore unleash  forces of  disintegration,  both  in  space  and  over 
time.  Even  overlooking  the  problems  that  are  bound  to  arise  during  the 
transitional  phase,  it  can  be  argued  that,  for  a  small  peripheral  state, 
the  effects  of  EMU  are  I ikely  to  follow  a  U-shaped  curve,  I ike  that 
traditionally  used  to  depict  equality  in  income  distribution  during  the 
economic  development  process,  i.e.  a  dec I ine  at  the  outset  followed  by  an 
increase  [11].  It  has  been  demonstrated  how  increased  trade  initially 
depresses  relative  wage  levels  in  small  peripheral  countries  relative  to 
the  centre,  before  allowing  them  to  catch  up.  The  relative  effect  of 
comparative  advanta~es and  economies  of  scale causes  the  benefits  to  depend 
as  much  on  in it i a I  cond it ions  as  on  nat ion a 1  and  region  a 1  po 1  i c i es,  and 
particularly  the  degree of  integration attained  [12]. 
Once  the  imp I i cat ions  of  the  U-shaped  curve  for  the  effects  of  economic 
union  on  the  periphery  have  been  understood,  it  would  appear  that  monetary 
union  would  not  change  matters.  As  the  forces  of  cohesion  are  real  and  not 
nominal,  divergence  would  only  result  from  insufficent  real  integration. 
But  over  the  transition  to  PEMU,  a  specific effect of  establishing a  single 
currency  cannot  be  ru I  ed  out .  It  is  worth  reca I I i ng  here  some  of  the 
results  of  the  survey  which  was  conducted  among  9  000  enterprises  in  1989 
by  the  lnstitut  fUr  Wirtschaftsforschung  (IFO)  into  the  effects  on 
competitiveness of  national  and  regional  factors  and  which  demonstrated  how 
little  importance  was  attached  to  exchange  rates  in  comparison  with  the 
cost  of  credit  and  with  infrastructure  endowment.  This  clearly  echoes  the 
conclusion  concerning  the  hierarchical  structure of  domestic  money  markets 
and  the  multiplier  effect  which  credit  restrictions at  the  centre  exert  on 
the  solvency of  enterprises at  the  periphery. 
Is  there  a  hierarchical  relationship  between  the  central,  outward-looking 
money  market  and  the  closed  local  and  regional  money  markets,  on  which 
small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  depend  ?  This  hierarchy  exists  in  the 
United  States  and  it  is  I ike I  y  to  be  even  more  pronounced  in  the  EC.  It 
would  then  exert  a  multiplier  effect  which,  through  restrictions  on  the 
central  money  market,  would  work  to  the  detriment  of  peripheral 
enterprises.  The  monopoly  power  enjoyed  by  local  intermediaries  is 
reflected  in  an  additional  premium  on  the  difference  between  borrowing  and 
lending  rates.  That  premium  is  intended  to  compensate  for  the  higher  risk 
but  also reflects  the  I ikel ihood  of  a  local  financial  col lapse  [13]. 
The  financial  weakness  of  a  particular  region  or  country  can  be  aggravated 
by  a  link  with  a  strong  currency,  since  such  a  link  will  not  permit  a 
corresponding  reduction  in  the  risk  premium.  Such  reduction  is  of  course 
the  signal  of  the  credibi I ity  of  the  change  in  regime.  It  is  difficult  to 
measure  but  is  often  i nfered  from  the  rea I  interest  differentia Is  with 
respect  to some  numeraire  currency.  These  differentials should  not  be  zero, 
however,  when  changes  in  reI at i ve  prices  are  expected,  for  reasons  of - 10 -
structural  adjustment  or  as  part  of  the  catching-up  process  .  In  table  3, 
column  3  reveals  that  between  1986  and  1990  the  Portuguese  escudo  revalued 
in  real  terms  against  the  D-mark,  turning  a  devaluation  at  an  annual  rate 
of  3%  in  1981  into a  revaluation of  5%  in  1990  [14]. 
The  difference  between  real  interest  rates  has  different  interpretations 
depending  on  whether  capital  exporting  or  capital  importing  countries  are 
being  considered.  A  fa 1  I  in  the  average  differentia I  ref I  ects  greater 
capital  mobility  due  to  a  fall  in  risk  premium  for  a  capital  importing 
country,  that  is  having  access  to  cheaper  financing  or  a  reduction  in  real 
interest  rates.  On  the  contrary  the  effect  of  a  fall  in  risk  premium  for 
the  capital  exporting  country  would  be  accros  to  better  investment 
opportunities,  so  that  the  real  interest  rate rises. 
The  interpretation  of  the  average  differentials  reported  in  table  3  in 
terms  of  I  ending  on  deposit  rates  shou 1  d  enter  into  account  that  the 
intermediation  margin  wi  II  tend  to  be  higher  in  a  peripheral  money  market 
than  in  the  emerging  central  money  market.  Moreover,  since  1990  an  implicit 
intermediary  tax  helped  making  lending  rates  much  higher  than  deposit 
rates.  This  allowed  the  local  monopoly  of  Portuguese  financial 
intermediaries  to  be  preserved even  though  it was  in  part offset  by  the  use 
of  banks  of  (implicit)  tax  col lectors. 
Independently  of  the  intermedia  covered  interest  differentials  are  perhaps 
a  better  measure  of  obstacles  to  international  capital  mobility.  In  this 
regard,  Portugal  and  Spain's differentials  with  respect  to  the  dollar  fel I 
significantly  in  1987  [15].  On  relevant  to  PEMU  and  Portugal's  transition 
thereto  is  the  fact  that  the  risk  premium  between  the  escudo  and  the  mark 
also  fell  from  -2%  in  1987  to  zero  (column  4  of  table  3)  and  ...  the 
exchange  rate  premium  in  column  2  fel I  from  6%  to  2%  beween  1985  and  1990, 
reflecting  source  shadowing  of  the  German  currency.  At  the  same  time  this 
premium  allowed  that  the  sign  reversal  of  the  real  differential  (from  10% 
in  1987  to -3%  in  1990)  while significant,  be  dampened  relative  to  the  real 
appreciation of  the  escudo-mark  rate. 
VIII.  Cohesion  factors 
How  can  we  identify  the  factors  that  wi  I I  enable  us  to  secure  cohesion  and 
hence  stabi I ity  in  the  Community  as  we  move  towards  EMU?  The  first  question 
is  whether  the  economic  regime  has  changed  sufficiently  to  allow  the 
catching-up  process  to  take  place  so  that  the  main  condition  laid  down  in 
Article  130b  is met. 
Apart  from  per  capita  income,  which  we  have  already  discussed,  factors 
relating  to  economic  distance  also  matter,  and  these  include  not  only  the 
number  of  kilometres  but  also  the  travel I ing  time  and  cost  and  the  ease  of 
communication.  This  poses  the  problem  not  only of  physical  infrastructures, 
especially  means  of  communication,  but  also  of  social  infrastructures, 
human  capital  and  ski I Is.  Actually  training  matters  both  in  general  terms 
and  in  its specific application  to  the  firm.  The  results of  the  IFO  survey 
also  confirm  the  infrastructure  challenges  facing  the  reformed  structural 
Funds  and  German  efforts  in  connection with  unification. 
Industrial  structure  is at  the  root  of  the optimistic and  pessimistic views 
referred  to  earlier.  In  cases  where  trade  is  based  on  traditional 
inter-industry  specialization,  the  adjustment  costs  can  be  significant. 
This  app I i es  to  Greece,  which  exports  goods  with  a  high  unsk i I I  ed-1 abour 
content.  Intra-industry  trade  based  on  economies  of  scale,  which  is  a 
feature  of  the  situation  in  Spain  and  Ireland,  is  already  less  likely  to 
generate  high  adjustment  costs.  The  way  in  which  the  factors  of  production - 11  -
respond  to  economic  union  wi  II  thus  depend  on  the  pattern  of  trade,  with 
greater  resistance being expected  from  national  producers where  traditional 
inter-industry  trade predominates.  It  may  be  that  Portugal  is closer  now  to 
Spain  than  Greece,  although  the  situation  is  sti I I  unclear.  The  situation 
is  not  clear  either  in  the  case  of  Ireland,  whose  aggressive  commitment  to 
attracting  direct  foreign  investment  has  created  a  pattern  of  development 
that  appears  to  discriminate  against  domestic  capital,  resulting  in 
payments  in  respect  of  foreign  capital  that  wi  I I  amount  to over  10%  of  GOP 
in  1991. 
Financial  hierarchy  is  also  liable  to  affect  the  costs  of  adjusting  to 
monetary  union.  Countries whose  financial  system  is sti I I  heavily  regulated 
and  whose  financial  fragi I ity  is  thus  less visible are  those more  I ikely  to 
suffer  credit  restrictions  during  the  transition:  Portugal  is  perhaps 
closer  to  Greece  than  Spain  in  this  respect,  while  a  great  deal  of 
diversity  is  to  be  expected  in  the  countries'  regions  - even  in  the  two 
sma I I  econom i es . 
The  variable  importance  of  these  factors  in  particular  countries  and 
regions  clearly  demonstrates  the  role  of  national  policies  in  the 
catching-up  process.  The  three  fundamental  criteria  have  to  do  with  labour 
mobi  I ity,  structural  policies  and  interventions  to  support  the  catching-up 
process,  and  the  role  played  by  exchange-rate  pol icy.  If  high  emigration 
eliminates  poverty  in  a  region  or  country  by  drawing  out  people,  the 
political  and  social  base of  self determination  vanishes,  even  though  there 
would  be  no  barrier  to  investment.  Under  these  con·ditions,  public  transfers 
without  a  sound  macroeconomic  and  microeconomic  basis  may  lead  the  least 
productive  workers  not  to  emigrate,  Inducing  shifts  in  behaviour  which 
wou I  d  make  backwardness  cumu I  at i ve  and  which  wou I  d  endanger  economic  and 
social  cohesion.  Final ly,the  seriousness of  the  problem  wi  I I  depend  on  the 
mechanism  to  accommodate  the  real  appreciation  resulting  from  an  inflation 
differential,  once  the  decision  to  fix  the  nominal  exchange  rate  has  been 
taken  [16]. 
The  varying  combinations  of  the  three  criteria  high! ight  the  diversity  of 
situations  encountered.  High  labour  mobility  coupled  with  fixed  exchange 
rates necessitates  the  transfer  of  greater  resources  than  when  coupled with 
flexible  exchange  rates.  This  having  been  said,  the  situation  of  central, 
southern  and  northwestern  Spain  inspires  greater  confidence  than  that  of 
southern  Italy,  simply  because  the  former  has  been  recognised  more 
recently.  Indeed,  the  combination  of  the  three  criteria  is  the  same  (high 
nation-wide  labour  mobi  I ity,  substantial  transfer  of  resources,  fixed 
exchange  rate).  Does  the  future  hold  an  Extremadurian  or  Calabrian 
(respectively  50%  and  60%  of  Community  average  as  shown  in  Table  2)  fate 
for  eastern Germany? 
In  the  same  vein,  Ireland  displays  less  marked  international  labour 
mobility  and  receives  fewer  transfers  from  outside  than  a  region  within 
Italy,  Spain  or  Germany,  but  maintains  a  fixed  exchange  rate.  Greece  and 
Portugal,  for  their  part,  also  have  a  low  degree  of  international  mobi  I ity 
of  labour  and  receive  less  by  way  of  transfers  from  the  EC  than 
underdeveloped  regions  in  Spain,  Italy  or  Germany  receive  from  their 
central  government  and  the  EC  combined.  Yet,  unlike  Ireland,  Portugal  and 
Greece  have  kept  a  flexible  exchange  rate.  The  relative confidence  inspired 
by  Ireland  and  Portugal  contrasts with  the  concern  felt  about  the  situation 
in  Greece.  Spain  argues  in  the  IGC  that  Community  solidarity  is  not 
sufficient given  the  desired  degree of  deepening  involved.  Yet,  there  is  no 
evidence  that  the  absorption  capacity of  the  three  smal I  countries could  be 
greatly  increased. - 12 -
1  X  •  cone 1  us  1  on 
In  approaching  the  current  IGCs  with  a  mixture  of  enthusiasm  and  caution, 
Portugal  is one  example  of  special  interest,  among  the  poorer  and  divergent 
Member  States  because  it  seems  to  be  combining  unity  with  diversity. 
Whatever  its  merits  in  the  IGCs,  such  constructive  ambiguity  should  not, 
however,  characterize  the  fight  of  the  Portuguese  monetary  and  fiscal 
authorities against  inflation.  Fortunately,  inflation  is  no  longer  favoured 
by  the  Government  which  now  refrains  from  collecting  hidden  taxes  through 
the  fall  in  the  purchasing  power  of  the  currency.  Despite  the  transitory 
cost  of  disinflation,  its  inevitability warns  us  against  the  temptation  of 
believing  that  the  change  in  regime  can  be  consolidated  without  nominal 
convergence.  From  that  standpoint,  reducing  inflation  to  a  level  close  to 
the  Community  average  is  a  necessary  condition  for  a  sustainable 
catching-up  process  [17]. 
This message  is also  relevant  for  the  interaction between  the  issues  in  the 
two  IGCs  but  making  the  catching  up  process  an  issue  for  political  union 
risks backfiring,  especially  for  recipient  countries where  the  regional  and 
federal  dimensions  are  largely  absent,  such  as  Greece,  Ireland  and 
Portugal.  The  parable  of  union  and  cohesion  suggests  instead  that  the 
regime  change  needs  to  be  initiated  by  strong  budgetary  adjustment  in 
Greece  and  consolidated  by  continued  budgetary  and  monetary  restraint  in 
Portugal.  In  Ireland,  nominal  convergence  was  achieved  faster  but 
structural  adjustment  for  real  convergence  has  been  slower. 
The  only  reason  to  doubt  that  the  change  in  regime  can  be  deep  enough  to 
achieve  both  nominal  and  real  convergence  is  the  widespread  idea  that  it 
takes  a  long  time  to acquire  the  reputation  for  price stabi 1 ity,  whereas  it 
is  lost  very  quickly.  In  spite of  the  popularity of  this  assumption  in  the 
theoretical  literature,  there  are  limitations  to  an  argument  based  almost 
exclusively  on  the  passage  of  time.  Making  the  1 imitations  of  pure  time 
seniority apparent  to alI  by  acquiring  a  good  reputation quickly  is  perhaps 
the  greatest  contribution  the  new  member  States  can  provide  to  the 
construction of  PEMU.  Indeed,  the  lesson of  Southern  regime  change  can  have 
profound  incentive  effects  on  the  path  of  reform  in  Centra I  and  Eastern 
Europe,  thereby  contributing  to secure  an  ever-widening  Eastern  frontier  to 
the  European  economy. - 13  -
NOTES 
[1]  The  approach  draws  on  a  book  which  I  edited with  Christopher  81 iss  for 
the  Centre  for  Economic  Policy  Research,  Unity  with  Diversity  in  the 
European  Economy:  The  Community's  Southern  Frontier,  Cambridge: 
Cambridge  University Press,  1990 
[ 2]  The  report  was  pub I i shed  in  European  Economy  No  44,  ent it I  ed  .. One 
market,  one  money- An  evaluation of  the  potential  benefits  and  costs 
of  forming  an  economic  and  monetary  union  ...  The  impact  over  time  and 
space  is described  in  Chapters 8  and  9  respectively. 
[3]  Strictly  speaking,  the  absence  of  taxes  requires  more  than  private 
ownerships  of  all  (vital  and  excludable)  goods;  there  must  be  no 
externalities  as  wei  I  (or  at  least  the  abi I ity  to  introduce  a  market 
for  the externality).  The  distinction between  public  and  private goods 
should  also  not  be  overdone  as  there  are  many  mixed  goods.  See 
Alessandra easel Ia  and  Jonathan  Feinstein,  "Pub I ic  Goods  in  Trade:  On 
the  Formation  of  Markets  and  Political  Jurisdictions  .. ,  Centre  for 
Economic  Pol icy  Research  Discussion  Paper  No  511,  February  1991. 
[4]  The  analytical  interpretation  in  the  text  does  not  presume  that  states 
and  nations  need  coincide,  and  therefore  does  not  rationalize  the 
boundaries  of  states;  certainly  chance  plays  an  important  role  in  the 
state boundaries.  Current  tensions within multinational  states such  as 
the  Yougoslavian  or  the  Soviet  Union  - to  include clear only  European 
examples  outside  the  Community  - suggest  the  advantage  of  an 
analytical  approach  and  under I ine  more  or  less  the  importance  of 
homogeneous  preferences  among  nationals. 
[5]  See  Dieter  Helm  and  Stephen  Smith,  .. The  Assessment:  Economic 
Integration  and  the  Role  of  the  European  Community .. ,  Oxford  Review  of 
Economic  Pol icy,  Vol.  5,  N"  2.  See  also  "Subsidiarity and  Economic  and 
Monetary  Union .. ,  unpublished  document,  Directorate  General  for 
Economic  and  Financial  Affairs,  where  the  quotation  from  the  1931 
Papal  encycl ica  is  reproduced. 
[6]  These  arguments  are  due  to  Tors ten  Persson  and  Guido  Tabe iIi n i,  .. The 
Politics  of  1992:  Fiscal  Pol icy  and  European  Integration  .. ,  National 
Bureau  of  Economic  Research  Working  Paper  No  3460,  October  1990. 
[7]  See  Bliss:  .. Adjustment  Compensation  and  Factor  Mobi  I ity  in  Integrated 
Markets  .. ,  Chapter  2  of  =U.;..;n....;..i .....  t..._y---.;w;...;.i....;:t...:..;;h-=D'-'i-=v'-"=e'"'"r-'=s;...;.i....;:t...,_y,  and  the  commentary  by 
Michael  Emerson,  ibid.  Once  again  neither  local  nor  supranational 
governments  need  be  less  prone  to  rent  seeking  activities  and 
bureaucratic  feature. 
[8]  An  anonymous  referee  states  correctly  that  :  Whether  aid  is  directly 
in  the  form  of  subsidies  to  the  consumption  of  peripheral  populations 
or  via  subsidies  to  investment,  the  net  effect  is  I ikely  to  be  similar 
viz.  capital  flows  to  labour  rather  than  the  other  way  around  (in  the 
first  case  wages  wi  I I  be  lower  than  they  would  otherwise  be).  To  coin 
a  phrase  .. Who  receives  the  subsidy  is  not  the  same  as  who  reaps  the 
benefit ... - 14 -
[9]  Per  capita gross domestic  product  in  Ireland stood at  64%  in  1980,  the 
same  level  as  in  1986,  whereas  gross  national  disposable  product  had 
fa I I  en  from  65%  to  60%  of  the  Community  average.  I  am  gratefu I  to 
Sean  Berrigan,  who  is  responsible  for  Ireland  in  the  Directorate  for 
Nat iona I  Economies  ,  for  drawing  this  significant  difference  to  my 
attention. 
[10]  This  is  the  report  mentioned  in  note  [2]  above. 
[11]  This  traditional  theory,  developed  by  Simon  Kuznets,  has  been 
challenged.  See  The  state  of  development  economics:  program  and 
perspectives,  edited  by  Gustav  Ravis  and  T.  Paul  Schultz,  Oxford: 
Basi I  Blackwel I,  1990,  Chap.  15. 
[12]  Paul  Krugman  in  Chapter  3 of  Unity  with  diversitY. 
[13]  Wi  I I iam  Branson  in  Chapter  5 of  Unity  with  diversity. 
[14]  See  the  chapter  on  Portugal  in  Unity  and  Diversity,  especially  Table 
9.16.  I  am  grateful  to  Joao  Paulo  Carvalho,  who  is  responsible  for 
Portugal  in  the  Directorate  for  National  Economies,  for  the 
computations  underlying  table  3.  Comparing  these  figures  with  the 
current  interest  differental  against  the  dollar  we  see  a  specific 
premium  for  the  Dmark  of  1.3%  in  1989  and  .8%  in  1988. 
[15]  See  the  chapter  on  Portugal  in  Unity  with  Diversity,  especially  Table 
9.15.  The  implicit  intermediation  tax  has  been  calculated  by  Jose 
Fernando  Matos  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance  of  Portugal,  using  the 
international  borrowing  rate  of  the  public  sector  as  a  benchmark.  It 
then  drops  from  3.1%  of  GOP  in  1984  to  zero  in  1985  and  rises  to  1.4% 
in  1988,  with  smal I  negative  values  in  1986  and  1987.  This  is  due  to 
the  fact  that  the  domestic  interest  rate on  public  debt  rose  above  the 
foreign  rate  plus  the  realized effective  depreciation  of  the  exchange 
rate,  which  was  very  smal I  from  1985  to  1987  and  rose  again  in  1988, 
even  though  the  escudo  did  not  greatly  depreciate  against  the  Deutsch 
mark  during  that  year. 
[16]  This  question  is  tackled  by  Krugman  in  Chapter  6  of  Unity  with 
diversity. 
[17]  The  same  conclusion  is  reached  in  the  report  on  the  latest 
multi lateral  survei I lance  exercise  for  Portugal,  which  is available  as 
No  2  in  the  new  series  of  Country  Studies,  published  by  the 
Commission's  Directorate-General  for  Economic  and  Financial  Affairs.  A 
comprehensive  list  of  the  expected  effects  of  monetary  union  on  the 













Table  1 
Gross  national  disposable product  per  capita 
(as X of  the average  for  the Community  of Twelve) 
Spain  Ireland  Portugal 
60  (0)  64  (+3)  40  (+1) 
75  ( +1)  62  (+2)  53  (+4) 
73  (0)  65  (+1)  60  (+5) 
72  (0)  62  (-3)  55  (+3) 
72  (0)  60  (-4)  56  (+3) 
74  (0)  62  (-3)  58  (+4) 
75  (0)  61  (-4)  58  (+4) 
77  (+1)  62  (-5)  60  (+5) 
78  (+1)  66  (-3)  62  (+6) 
79  (+2)  66  (-3)  62  (+5) 
82.0  65.8  62.3 
1975  1975  1991 
Greece 
40  (+1) 
54  (+2) 
62  (+4) 
59  (+2) 
58  (+2) 
57  (+3) 
57  (+3) 
57  (+3) 
56  (+3) 
56  (+3) 
62.1 
1978 
Source:  The  GOP  values  (adjusted  for  purchasing  power  standards) 
used  in  ca I  cuI at i ng  gross  nat ion  a I  d i sposab I  e  product  are 
taken  from  the  blue  pages  of  European  Economy  No  46.  The 
figures  for  1990  and  1991  are Commission  forecasts. 
Note:  Gross  national  disposable product- GOP+  figure  in  brackets 
<- net  return on  factors  +  current  transfers) - 16 -
Table  2 
The  10  least-developed  regions 
(as percentage of  EC  average) 
Average  1986-88  1988 
Ranking  Region 
1  Northern  Aegean 
2  North 
3  I  pi ros 
4  Alentejo 
5  Algarve 
6  Western  Macedonia 
7  Crete 
8  Extremadura 
9  Western  Greece 
10  Centre 
Other 
(15)  p 













21  Calabria  1 
25  Ireland  IRL 
28  Mainland  Greece  GR 
30  Lisbon  and  Tagus  Val ley  P 
(35)  E 
(118)  I 
129  Balearic  Islands  E 
171  Groningen  NL 
Community  average 
GNP  Unemployment 



































































Sources:  GOP:  cf.  Table  1.  Other  variables:  Commission  of  the  European 
Communities,  Fourth  Periodic  Report  on  the  Regions  of  the 
Community,  1991. 
Note:  There  are  174  NUTS  Level  2  regions,  but  no  figures  for  the 
French  overseas  departments  or  the  Portuguese  Autonomous 
Communities.  This  reduces  the  f·igure  to  171.  The  ranking  for 
P,  GR,  E and  I  (shown  in  brackets)  is  not  taken  into account. 
With  the  except ion  of  Lisbon,  the  Norte  region  and  Ire I  and, 
the  regions  I isted  make  up  less  than  1%  of  the  total 
population  of  the  Community.  At  country  level,  Ireland 
accounts  for  1%  of  the  Community's  population,  Portugal  and 
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Table  3 
Real  interest differentials of  the escudo 
against  the Deutsch  mark 
(X p.  a.> 
( 1)  (2)  (3) 
r-r*  f-e  e+p*-p 
1. 3  0.2  +2.9 
0.6  5.0  -4.4 
-2.9  5.8  -7.7 







Source:  Commission  of  the  European  Communities. 
Note:  I  (i*)  3  month  interbank  rate  in  Portugal  (Germany) 
p  (p*)  consumer  price  inflation  in  Portugal  (Germany) 
f,e  3  month  forward  (spot)  rate of  escudo/Dmark 
r-i-p  (r*•i*-p*) -18-
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